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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v. United States made peoples’ reasonable
expectations of privacy the touchstone for determining whether state surveillance amounts
to a search under the Fourth Amendment. Ever since Katz, Supreme Court justices and
numerous scholars have referenced the inherent circularity of the expectations of privacy
framework: People’s expectations of privacy depend on Fourth Amendment law, so it is
circular to have the scope of the Fourth Amendment depend on those same expectations.
Nearly every scholar who has written about the issue has assumed that the circularity of
expectations is a major impediment to having the scope of the Fourth Amendment depend
in any way on what ordinarily people actually expect. But no scholar has tested the
circularity narrative’s essential premise, which is that when salient, well-publicized
changes in Fourth Amendment law occur, popular sentiment falls into line.
Our paper conducts precisely such a test. We conducted surveys on censusweighted samples of US citizens immediately before, immediately after, and long after the
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Riley v. California. The decision in Riley was
unanimous and surprising. It substantially altered Fourth Amendment law concerning the
privacy of peoples’ cell phone content, and it was a major news story that generated
relatively high levels of public awareness in the days after it was decided. We find that
immediately after the Riley decision the public began to expect greater privacy in the
contents of their cell phones, though the effect was small and appears to have been
confined to the 40% of our sample that reported having heard of the Riley decision. One
year after Riley, these heightened expectations had disappeared completely. There was no
difference from baseline two years after Riley either, with privacy expectations remaining
where they were prior to the decision. Our findings suggest that privacy expectations are
far more stable than judges and commentators have been assuming. Even in the ideal
circumstance of a clear, unanimous, and widely reported decision, circularity in Fourth
Amendment attitudes is both weak and short-lived. In the longer term, Fourth Amendment
circularity appears to be a myth. The paper concludes by comparing the public’s response
to Riley with its reaction to the Supreme Court’s contemporaneous Hobby Lobby decision
and situates our results within the political science literature on attitudinal responses to
significant Supreme Court decisions.
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It is very difficult to find any proposition in Fourth Amendment law to
which every judge, lawyer, and scholar subscribes. One striking point about
which nearly everyone – left, right, and center – agrees, however, is that
there is a degree of circularity in the Katz “reasonable expectations of
privacy” test. Among those expressing concern about this circularity are
Justices Samuel Alito, Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and John Paul
Stevens, Judges Alex Kozinski, Richard Posner, and George MacKinnon,
and Professors Jed Rubenfeld, Dan Solove, Amitai Etzioni, Erwin
Chemerinsky, David Sklansky, Orin Kerr, Michael Abramowicz, Mary
Coombs, and Paul Schwartz. 1 In this paper we show that this widely shared
concern is misplaced.
Justice Harlan’s opinion in Katz v. United States makes a person’s
reasonable expectations of privacy the touchstone for determining whether
police surveillance amounts to a search and, therefore, is subject to
restrictions under the Fourth Amendment. 2 Under Katz and the numerous
cases that follow its approach, the government conducts a search when it
invades an “expectation [of privacy]...that society is prepared to recognize
as ‘reasonable.’” 3 If the government’s surveillance intrudes upon such an
expectation, the Fourth Amendment is implicated and the government must
either get a search warrant or satisfy one of the limited exceptions to the
warrant requirement. If the government’s surveillance does not implicate a
reasonable expectation of privacy, then the Fourth Amendment is
inapplicable and no warrant is required.
The exact meaning of Katz’s reasonable expectations of privacy test is
controversial, but its text has led some scholars to argue that the test should
depend in part on how everyday members of the public think about

1

See infra text accompanying notes 7-25.

2

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating
that police conduct amounts to a search, thereby implicating the Fourth
Amendment, when “a person [exhibits] an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy, and [when] the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”). The test from Justice Harlan’s concurrence subsequently became
the key Fourth Amendment inquiry, embraced repeatedly by the Supreme Court
over time. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (“The
touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether someone had a
“constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”) (citing the Harlan
concurrence in Katz); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (describing
the Supreme Court majority’s application of Justice Harlan’s Katz test in several
cases).
3

Id.
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privacy. 4 And in some prominent post-Katz cases, the Supreme Court has
said it is doing exactly that. 5 The problem that many have identified with
this approach to Katz is that reasonable people should expect the privacy
rights granted to them by the courts. So expectations define the scope of
legal protection, but the legal protections themselves should define the
expectations.
This potential circularity gives rise to a practical problem. Once the
state begins using an investigative technique, and especially once the courts
authorize the state to do so, ordinary people’s expectations of privacy may
adjust. Thus, even if people expected privacy in a context at some earlier
point in time, subsequent actions by the government can erode those
expectations, enabling the state to conduct invasive surveillance in the
future without having to secure a warrant. If this understanding of
expectations is correct, the Fourth Amendment provides little protection
against a government that acts strategically; all it need do is move slowly
and publicize what it is doing. Further, the judicial determination of whether
an expectation of privacy exists would be largely empty; even if the court
gets the answer “wrong,” public expectations would in time adapt to make it
“right.” For those who argue that the reasonableness of a privacy
expectation should depend on whether the expectation is widely shared, this
is an especially salient problem. If public expectations are mostly just a
function of whatever the Supreme Court said last, then for the Court to
account for such expectations would result in it talking to itself.
The Fourth Amendment circularity hypothesis is intuitive and easy to
grasp. There are just two problems with the circularity story: (1) there is no
empirical evidence supporting it, and (2) an empirical literature in political
science provides ample reason to doubt it. In this paper, we have gathered
and analyzed new data that suggest that popular expectations of privacy are
very stubborn. Though expectations move a little right after a landmark
Supreme Court Fourth Amendment decision substantially changes the law,
4

See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007); Matthew B. Kugler &
Lior J. Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine,
and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 219, 230 (2016); Christine S.
Scott-Hayward et al., Does Privacy Require Secrecy? Societal Expectations of
Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19 (2015); Christopher Slobogin &
Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in
Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized
and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993).
5

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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within a span of months they snap right back to where they were beforehand
and they remain stable thereafter. As best we can tell, the circularity of
reasonable expectations of privacy is a myth.
Part I of the paper presents the problem of circularity. At stake in this
discussion is the feasibility of incorporating public expectations into the
doctrine. If expectations are independent of current case law, then looking
to public expectations can provide a correcting impulse against an out of
touch judiciary. If, on the other hand, expectations merely reflect what
courts have said, then there is no point to considering public attitudes; no
information would be gained. The section begins by explaining the Supreme
Court’s concern that expectations of privacy would become an empty
concept, and that a government could strategically condition the populace to
accept ever-greater privacy invasions. We then cite many Fourth
Amendment scholars expressing the same concern. Lastly, we examine a
literature from political science and psychology commenting on public
reactions to Supreme Court decisions. This literature informed our
skepticism that the public would uncritically mirror the Court’s rulings.
In Part II we describe the case at the core of our study: Riley v.
California. The case established a new rule for the searching of electronic
devices incident to arrest, what can fairly be read as a “computers are
different” standard. This case was perfectly suited to prompting a major
change in public expectations. The ruling was clear, it was broad, it was
surprising, it was unanimous, and it prompted a torrent of media coverage.
As Fourth Amendment cases go, we could not have hoped for better; it
stacked the deck in favor of finding a change of expectations, and yet no
lasting change was observed.
In Part III we present the empirical study itself. We recruited censusrepresentative participants in four waves: one right before the decision, one
right after, a one-year follow-up, and a two-year follow-up. What we found
was a small shift in the direction of the Court’s decision in the survey
conducted immediately after the decision came down. But this shift was 1.)
specific to the exact question in Riley and did not generalize to related
questions, 2.) was present only among those who reported having heard of
the decision, and 3.) disappeared the following year. Put another way, the
Supreme Court manage to move privacy expectations only slightly and only
for a very short period of time. Based on these data, circularity does not
seem to be a problem.
In Part IV, we examine the implications of these data for Fourth
Amendment doctrine and relate our findings back to the political science
literature on the effects of Supreme Court decisions on public attitudes. We
also show that a nearly simultaneous Supreme Court decision, Hobby Lobby

6
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v. Burwell, had a short-lived polarizing effect on the public. This finding
underscores the complicated interplay between the Supreme Court and the
general public and adds further reason to believe that circularity is neither
strong nor common.
I.) THE (ALLEGED) PROBLEM OF CIRCULARITY
Prior to this study, many legal thinkers were concerned by the potential
for circularity. Not long before his appointment to the federal bench,
Richard Posner observed “it is circular to say that there is no invasion of
privacy unless the individual whose privacy is invaded had a reasonable
expectation of privacy; whether he will or will not have such an expectation
will depend on what the legal rule is.” 6 This sums up the alleged problem of
circularity perfectly: Reasonable people should not expect more privacy
than the courts have told them will be protected. If the level of privacy
expected by society is both the cause and consequence of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, then the entire area of law reduces to a
discussion of chickens, eggs, and primacy.
The circularity of the Katz inquiry is an idea with a long and
distinguished pedigree. The Supreme Court’s first recognition of the
potential circularity problem arose in an opinion called Rakas, decided in
1978. In footnote 12, the Court talked about the circularity problem:
[I]t would, of course, be merely tautological to fall back
on the notion that those expectations of privacy which are
legitimate depend primarily on cases deciding exclusionaryrule issues in criminal cases. Legitimation of expectations of
privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or
personal property law or to understandings that are
recognized and permitted by society. 7
The Court is noting that it is illogical and unappealing to base whether
someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy on whether the court cases
say he or she does. 8 To avoid this kind of doctrinal circularity, courts are to
6

Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court,
1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 188 (1979)

7
8

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).

See, e.g., Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2001)
(referring to the “unmistakable circularity” of such an approach); United States v.
Johnson, 561 F.2d 832, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Mackinnon, J., concurring) (“Katz.
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determine whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists based on
considerations extrinsic to Fourth Amendment doctrine, such as property
law and popular expectations.
But looking to public attitudes only escapes circularity if one believes
that those attitudes won’t generally be driven by the doctrine itself. Within a
year of Rakas, the Supreme Court would start worrying about the problem
of feedback between what courts say and what the public expects. We will
refer to this hypothesized feedback as attitudinal circularity, the idea that
“understandings that are recognized … by society” will themselves be
determined by legal pronouncements. If attitudinal circularity is a real
concern then one of the solutions the Rakas Court offered for the problem
of doctrinal circularity is no solution at all: the content of the doctrine
would still depend on the content of the doctrine, just with the additional
step of popular expectations being influenced by, and in turn influencing,
doctrine. As the parade of scholars expressing concern over this kind of
circularity indicates, there is an intuitive plausibility to the notion that the
privacy expectations of reasonable people, those expectations to which Katz
refers, are dependent on the pronouncements of courts.
A. The Development of Circularity Concern
The Supreme Court’s first comments on attitudinal circularity appeared
in Smith v. Maryland, which involved the government’s use of a pen
register to determine what outgoing calls were being placed from a robbery
suspect’s home. 9 The Court in Smith applied the Katz framework yet, in the
doing so, the majority made the following observation:
Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz’ twopronged inquiry would provide an inadequate index of
Fourth Amendment protection. For example, if the
Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide
television that all homes henceforth would be subject to
warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact
entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their
homes, papers, and effects. . . . In such circumstances, where
an individual’s subjective expectations had been
… incorporates a fair amount of circularity. One will have a reasonable
expectation of privacy over those areas that courts tell him he may reasonably
expect to be private.”). See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTION: A
UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 25 (2008).
9

442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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“conditioned” by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth
Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations
obviously play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection was.
In determining whether a “legitimate expectation of
privacy” existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be
proper. 10
Here the Court is bringing attitudinal circularity to the forefront. The
hypothetical example chosen by the Court posits that the government’s
action (a frightening, Orwellian announcement that reaches millions of
Americans) changes the attitudes of the citizenry. After the announcement,
expectations of privacy have dissipated, and the government can invoke the
(now) low privacy expectations of the citizenry if any lawyer tries to
challenge the legality of the new policy in court. Such hypothetical (and
unrealistic) circumstances could indeed create a logical problem for the
doctrine. 11 This hypothetical attacks the idea that popular attitudes are
largely indifferent to state action, which seemed intuitive to the Court in
Rakas. Therefore the clever Rakas remedy of looking at people’s beliefs no
longer helps resolve matters. To deal with this attitudinal circularity
problem the Court would need to ignore people’s actual attitudes and
instead answer hard normative questions about what level of privacy people
ought to expect.
That said, it is worth underscoring that there are no documented
instances of the federal government acting in a manner as brazen as what is
described in the Smith hypothetical. 12 There is presumably a first time for
everything, but the Smith hypothetical would be unprecedented in this
10

Id. at 740 n.5.

11

See United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, J.)
(“imposing such a regime outright … can contribute to the downward ratchet of
privacy expectations.”); United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d 832, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring) (Katz “incorporates a fair amount of circularity.
One will have a reasonable expectation of privacy over those areas that courts tell
him he may reasonably expect to be private. Reference to another standard than
plain view is also required.”).
12

The initiation of mandatory baggage screening for airline passengers in January
of 1973 is a somewhat close example, though at the time such screening began,
regular air travel was a luxury out of reach for most Americans. See generally John
Rogers, Bombs, Borders, and Boarding: Combatting International Terrorism at
United States Airports and the Fourth Amendment, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNATL. L.
REV. 501, 507 (1997) (discussing the history of baggage screening).
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country. Setting it aside, popular expectations could easily be sufficiently
impervious to changes in the law or police practices to allow the kinds of
doctrinal uses referenced in Rakas. The proper empirical question is
whether the kinds of governmental actions that we regularly see, such as
new statutes or Supreme Court opinions, can meaningfully move attitudes.
In its post-Smith pronouncements the Court has continued to refer to
the Fourth Amendment’s circularity problem, but in terms that make it
harder to determine whether the Court is referencing doctrinal circularity or
attitudinal circularity. In the Court’s 2001 Kyllo opinion the majority
observed that the “Katz test—whether the individual has an expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable—has often been
criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.” 13
Subjectivity and unpredictability could be a problem associated with either
doctrinal uncertainty (the judges get to declare the law is whatever the law
they say it is) or attitudinal uncertainty (what the law is depends on how
judges think people are reacting, an inquiry that is in and of itself subjective
and hard to predict). More recently, Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Stevens
have all opined on the Fourth Amendment’s circularity problem,
referencing the issue in ways that sometimes hint that a particular form of
circularity is on their mind and sometimes in more ambiguous terms. 14
13
14

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)

Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)
(“The Katz expectation-of-privacy test avoids the problems and complications
noted above, but it is not without its own difficulties. It involves a degree of
circularity, and judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with
those of the hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks. In
addition, the Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable
person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. But technology
can change those expectations. Dramatic technological change may lead to periods
in which popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant
changes in popular attitudes.”) (citations omitted); Justice Kennedy, City of Los
Angeles v Patel (Mar 3, 2015), Oral Argument Transcript, available at 2015 WL
888287, at ∗13 (“If you prevail in this case and a member of the Court sits down to
write the opinion, does he or she have to use the phrase “reasonable expectation of
privacy” and say there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in our society, in
our culture, in our day, or do we just forget that phrase? In -- in a way, as we all
know it's circular, that if we say there is a reasonable expectation, then there is.”);
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 863 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Nor is
it enough, in deciding whether someone's expectation of privacy is ‘legitimate,’ to
rely on the existence of the offending condition or the individual's notice thereof.
The Court's reasoning in this respect is entirely circular. The mere fact that a
particular State refuses to acknowledge a parolee's privacy interest cannot mean

10
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More broadly, the Supreme Court has been all over the map in terms of
its approach to the Fourth Amendment. 15 In some of its decisions, the
Court’s sense of popular expectations plays a significant or even decisive
role, though invariably the Court is relying on justices’ educated guesses
about public expectations rather than scientific data. 16 In other cases, the
Court essentially ignores these expectations or insists they are irrelevant. 17
The purported circularity of expectations of privacy may be one reason
(among others) why the Court has never committed itself to a consistent
methodology that is tied to popular understandings of Americans’ control
over their persons, houses, papers, and effects. 18
B. The Scholarly Consensus on Attitudinal Circularity
Circularity has been a major point of discussion in Fourth Amendment
scholarship, and we can identify a great many instances of well-regarded
scholars articulating the attitudinal circularity. These scholars include
Amitai Etzioni, 19 Orin Kerr, 20 Jed Rubenfeld, 21 Dan Solove, 22 Erwin
that a parolee in that State has no expectation of privacy that society is willing to
recognize as legitimate—especially when the measure that invades privacy is both
the subject of the Fourth Amendment challenge and a clear outlier. With only one
or two arguable exceptions, neither the Federal Government nor any other State
subjects parolees to searches of the kind to which petitioner was subjected. And the
fact of notice hardly cures the circularity…” (citation omitted).
15

See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010), affirmed sub.
nom. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of
Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504-08 (2007).

16

Id. at 508-11 (discussing Supreme Court cases that follow what Kerr calls the
“probabilistic model,” including Bond v. United States, Minnesota v. Olson, and
California v. Ciraolo); see also City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 75760 (2010) (using employees’ expectations, based on their understanding of the law,
policies, and technologies, to determine the scope of the Fourth Amendment).
17

Id. at 511-12 (discussing Supreme Court cases that treat popular expectations as
irrelevant, including Illinois v. Caballes, United States v. Miller, and United States
v. Ross).
18

See generally id. at 544 (noting that the Supreme Court is most likely to adhere
to the probabilistic model of what government conduct constitutes a search when a
group of strongly held “social norms that are difficult for the government to
manipulate” and less likely to adhere to the model in other circumstances).
19

Amitai Etzioni, Eight Nails into Katz’s Coffin, 65 CASE. W. L. REV. 413, 414-19
(2014) (“It is difficult to comprehend why the well-established observation
that Katz is tautological is not itself sufficient to lay Katz to rest.”).
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Chemerinsky, 23 David Sklansky, 24 and Paul Schwartz, 25 among many
20

Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a
“Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?” 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 512-13 (2001) (“By
linking Fourth Amendment protection to the presence of extraconstitutional rights,
the rights-based conception ensures that the government cannot use its mere ability
to invade privacy [as in the Smith v. Maryland hypothetical] as a basis for
eradicating Fourth Amendment protection.”). In subsequent scholarship, Kerr
astutely noted that popular expectations cannot be completely determined by their
response to government practices and court pronouncements. See Kerr, supra note
15, at 511 n.34. Kerr described the degree of attitudinal circularity as “modest.” Id.
21

Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 132-33 (2008) ([T]he
circularity problem … afflicts expectations-of-privacy analysis. An announcement
that all telephone calls will henceforth be monitored deprives people of their
reasonable expectations of privacy in such calls.”).
22

Daniel Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1523–24
(2010) (“Second, expectations of privacy depend in part on the law, so judicial
decisions about reasonable expectations of privacy would have a bootstrapping
effect. If the Supreme Court said there was or was not a reasonable expectation of
privacy in something, then that pronouncement would affect people’s future
expectations.”).
23

Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS
L.J. 643, 650 (2007) (“Moreover, the Fourth Amendment approach to protecting
privacy based on whether there is a “reasonable expectation of privacy” also poses
serious problems. The government seemingly can deny privacy just by letting
people know in advance not to expect any.”).
24

David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think About Privacy
and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1069, 1072 n.8 (2014) (“The Court
nicely illustrated the potential of the Katz test for circularity the following term
when it upheld the routine collection of DNA samples from felony arrestees,
reasoning in part that arrestees have reduced ‘expectations of privacy’--and citing
for that proposition earlier decisions by the Court authorizing searches incident to
arrest. ‘Reasonable expectations of privacy’ can be defined by social norms rather
than legal rules, but the Katz test runs into a different kind of circularity: the
tendency over time for people to become accustomed to governmental violations
of privacy.”) (citations omitted).
25

Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public
Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 573 (1995) (“[T]he
Supreme Court's search for reasonable expectations of privacy is tautological. The
Fourth Amendment is held to be applicable in those circumstances in which people
reasonably expect it to be applicable. Thus, when a desire for privacy is
incommensurate with the general social view of reasonable privacy (or, more
accurately, the Supreme Court's estimation of this view), Fourth Amendment
protection does not exist. This amendment applies only when society already

12
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others. 26 Now not all of these scholars are concerned about circularity to the
same degree. Some are fairly skeptical, though even they feel they cannot
rule out the circularity problem entirely. 27
At this point it is worth introducing a distinction between two possible
versions of the attitudinal circularity hypothesis. The strong version states
that a well-publicized Supreme Court decision (or unchallenged action by
Congress or the Executive) will have the effect of swiftly changing privacy
expectations. People will hear of the decision, word will spread through
their social networks, and expectations will adjust accordingly. In contrast,
the weak version of circularity instead states that such governmental actions
will have the effect of changing privacy expectations only over a long
period of time, perhaps decades, as the change in law filters down through
police and popular culture. 28 Put another way, the strong version circularity
awaits it.”). Schwartz goes on to emphasize feedback between technological
development and popular expectations, a point later echoed by Paul Ohm. See infra
note 26.
26

See also Ronald J. Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of
the Fourth Amendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 536 (1977-1978) (“[T]he
major inadequacy of exclusive reliance on the reasonably prudent man standard is
that the standard merely reflects existing conditions without considering their
desirability. The government can unilaterally change existing conditions and thus
the expectations of reasonably prudent men.”); Jim Harper, Reforming Fourth
Amendment Privacy Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1381, 1392 (2007-2008) (“[The
reasonable expectation test’s] circularity is especially problematic here at the onset
of the Information Age …. If proponents of government surveillance can mold
expectations to their advantage, they can have broad access to communications.”).
Paul Ohm articulates a variation on the traditional attitudinal circularity account.
Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J.
1309, 1310-26 (2012) (“[T]he punch line is both easy to state and preordained
almost to the point of being tautological--in a world without privacy, a Fourth
Amendment built around reasonable expectations of privacy will no longer
apply.”). Ohm emphasizes how popular expectations change in response to the use
of new technologies more than case law developments, though which technologies
get adopted is in part dependent on court rulings.
27

Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60-62
(2001); Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights
of Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1596 (1987)
See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“We do not think
there is such justification for overruling Miranda. Miranda has become embedded
in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our
national culture.”).
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involves people watching CNN, Fox, and The Daily Show and the weak
version involves people watching Law and Order.
Most scholars discussing the circularity hypothesis are not clear which
version they are endorsing, and we do not want to put words in their
mouths. But many of them have used the circularity critique to either
suggest that the Katz test is incoherent, 29 or to specifically criticize the
incorporation of public expectations in Katz. 30 Scholars such as Christopher
Slobogin, Christine Scott-Hayward, and the two of us, 31 have argued that
the courts should regularly examine reliable survey evidence to determine
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists under Katz. 32 If ordinary
people’s expectations of privacy are determined mainly by what courts or
the executive say the law is, or are basically indeterminate, 33 then the social
science survey approach has little to recommend it. In our view, public
expectations should work as a corrective to outdated or obscure precedents
and out of touch judges. If popular attitudes instead largely reflect the most
recent actions of those same judges, looking to expectations gains society
nothing while further muddling an already confused area of law.
But circularity is only an effective critique of our position if one adopts
a strong, or at least stronger, conception of it. If one assumes that public
expectations only adapt over the span of decades, then there is no difficulty
in running surveys to assess public attitudes; the attitudes would still be
“real” and not the immediate product of the government action. It is only if
the attitudes change quickly that the survey researchers would find the
ground shifting under their feet.
Testing the attitudinal circularity hypothesis therefore becomes an
29

See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 650; Bacigal, supra note 26, at 536;
Harper, supra note 26, at 1392; Schwartz, supra note 26, at 573.
30

See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 24, at 1072 n. 8; Solove, supra note 22, at 1523–
24.
31

SLOBOGIN, supra note 4, at 13; Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 4, at 205;
Scott-Hayward et al., supra note 4, at 19; Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 4, at
727; Matthew B. Kugler, The Perceived Intrusiveness of Searching Electronic
Devices at the Border: An Empirical Study, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1165 (2014).

32

See, e.g., William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the
Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1852 (2016) (describing the
“standard objections based on the circularity of the enterprise” in which survey
approaches to Katz are engaged).
33

Orin S. Kerr, Do We Need a New Fourth Amendment?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 951,
964-65 (2009).
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urgent project for the first principles of Fourth Amendment law. If ordinary
peoples’ actual expectations of privacy are relatively stable and don’t
depend on government pronouncements, then privileging those attitudes
through doctrine may well be desirable. The case for turning to social
expectations in Fourth Amendment law would look a lot like the case for
examining social norms when trying to determine the content of property
law 34 or deferring to trade usages in contract litigation. 35 Widespread shared
beliefs probably (though not inevitably) reflect accumulated societal
wisdom. 36 And the more stable ordinary peoples’ expectations of privacy
are, the more predictive and stable social science studies conducted at one
point in time will be at a later date. 37 Conversely, the more unstable,
reactive, and random public attitudes are, the more reason to favor
alternative theories that define the proper scope of the Fourth Amendment
without any reference to popular expectations. 38 Answering the empirical
question of whether attitudes are circular then has a major impact on the
normative question of whether we should (or even can) look to such
attitudes when formulating doctrine.
We therefore consider what actually happens when the Supreme Court
issues a new decision on the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. When
a particular decision is not widely-known, logically it is unlikely to
immediately change society’s expectations of privacy. 39 However some
decisions receive widespread media coverage, and knowledge of a littleknown decision’s content conceivably could permeate the population over
time. The extent to which this actually happens in Fourth Amendment cases
is unclear. It is possible that these cases are just a flash in the pan, known to
some people for an instant and then immediately forgotten, with only
34

Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (1881); Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558, 559 (D. Mass.
1872); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991).
35

See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 63 (2015).

36

See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE
(1790).
37

See Kerr, supra note 33, at 964; Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 4, at 234.

38

See, e.g., Baude & Stern, supra note 32, at 1830-33; Barry Friedman & Cynthia
Benin Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable: The Protections for Policing, 84
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281 (2016); Kerr, supra note 15, at 503; Orin S. Kerr, An
Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476
(2011); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment
as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19 (1988).
39

Abramowicz, supra note 27, at 61–62; Coombs, supra note 27, at 1596.

23-Feb-17]

MYTH OF CIRCULARITY

15

lawyers and law students remembering that they ever happened. It is also
possible that they instead have long-term ripples that alter societal beliefs
through news coverage, mass-media content, interactions with law
enforcement, word-of-mouth, social media, and subtler mechanisms.
C. Social Sciences on Attitudinal Responses to Supreme Court
Decisions
Although a great deal of legal scholarship takes the notion of attitudinal
circularity for granted, one of our frustrations in confronting the existing
literature has been that it all ignores a large body of related political science
research. For decades political scientists have been studying precisely how
the public responds to major Supreme Court decisions. Yet legal scholars,
as far as we know, haven’t previously made any connection between this
literature and circularity.
In reviewing the political science literature, it is helpful to consider the
various (somewhat conflicting) findings through the lens of the
psychological literature on persuasion. Two general theories are relevant
here. The first is called motivated cognition. Imagine two people who
strongly disagree about an issue, perhaps the death penalty. If pressed, these
people would likely describe their views on the death penalty as stemming
from different factual assumptions about how potential criminals respond to
the existence of capital punishment, the number of mistaken convictions,
the overall crime rate, and a variety of other questions. One might
optimistically think that the level of disagreement would decline as these
two people were exposed to new studies on the efficacy of capital
punishment. Persuasion would not be total – no one gives up that easily –
but the two sides should come closer together. This, sadly, does not happen.
A classic study by Lord, Ross, and Lepper found that those exposed to
information supporting their position become more extreme in their support
while those exposed to information opposed to their position question the
new data, moving far less than did those whose views were reinforced. 40
The overall level of polarization actually increased due to this biased
assimilation of information.
Similar motivated cognition effects have been found time and time
again, as people are shown to shape their assimilation and processing of
new information to minimize the tension between it and their existing
40

Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence,
37 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979).
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beliefs. 41 This biased processing has been shown in interpretations
information in a number of contexts, including video evidence. 42 The
relevance of motivated cognition to public reactions is quite
straightforward: as in other contexts, we should expect people confronted
by court decisions that run counter to their prior preferences and beliefs to
resist those decisions rather than be immediately persuaded by them.
The second relevant theory is the Elaboration Likelihood Model of
persuasion (ELM). This model posits that the impact of a persuasive
message will vary depending on the extent to which listeners are willing
and able to process the message in depth. Listeners who are not motivated
to think deeply about an issue will respond to “peripheral” characteristics –
a liked or attractive source, for instance – whereas those who are motivated
to think deeply about the issue will respond based more on “central”
characteristics, such as the quality of the argument. 43 Those who are
motivated enough to attend to central characteristics often discount
peripheral cues, meaning that the value of, say, a celebrity endorsement
would be sharply limited to a highly attentive audience. Persuasion via the
central route is more likely to lead to long-term attitude change whereas
persuasion via the peripheral route is as superficial as the name suggests; it
is short term and not especially predictive of behavior. 44

41

Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL.
480 (1990). Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken, & Stanley Schachter, WHEN
PROPHECY FAILS: A SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF A MODERN GROUP
THAT PREDICTED THE DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD (1956).
42

Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J.
ABNORMAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954); Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a
Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 851, 853 (2012) (replicating the effect in the context of video evidence).
43

Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, The Elaboration Likelihood Model of
Persuasion, in 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 123
(Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986); Richard E. Petty & Daniel T. Wegener, The
Elaboration Likelihood Model: Current Status and Controversies, in DUAL
PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 41 (Shelly Chaiken & Yacov Trope
eds., 1999).
44

Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION:
CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE, 21 (1986) (“Attitude
changes that result mostly from processing issue-relevant arguments (central route)
will show greater temporal persistence, greater prediction of behavior, and greater
resistance to counter persuasion than attitude changes that result mostly from
peripheral cues”).
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One of the better predictors of the level of effort that a listener will put
into processing a message is their degree of personal involvement and the
strength of their initial attitude. 45 Those who have a personal connection to
an issue will attend to the message more. However, as suggested by the
literature on motivated cognition, this will not necessarily lead to more
accurate processing. 46 Listeners could easily spend that additional
processing power trying to counterargue against the persuasive message.
Let’s keep these psychological principles in mind as we consider the
political science literature. The modern era of political science
investigations into the relationship between Supreme Court decisions and
public opinion began with an empirical study by Robert Dahl, a giant figure
in American political science. 47 Dahl wrote in 1957 that although Congress
usually got its way eventually in cases where the Supreme Court invalidated
legislation, there were some cases where the Supreme Court had thwarted
the will of Congress, either through lasting invalidation or substantial
delay. 48 In such cases, Dahl wrote that the Court had prevailed because it
was an important agent of political leadership in the United States and had a
basis for power – “the unique legitimacy attributed to its interpretations of
the Constitution.” 49 Particularly where different branches of government
were in conflict with one another and where it was adopting a solution that
comported with “explicit or implicit norms held by the political leadership,”
the Supreme Court could make national policy. 50 This hypothesized
persuasion is based on approval of the source, which is generally viewed as
a peripheral cue in ELM terms.
Dahl’s study used an analysis of governmental action to develop his
45

Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, & Rachel Goldman, Personal Involvement
as a Determinant of Argument-Based Persuasion, 41 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 847–
55 (1981) (showing that personal relevance increases attention to message quality
and decreases the importance of peripheral cues).
46

Id. But see Lauren C. Howe & Jon A. Krosnick, Attitude Strength, 68 ANNU.
REV. PSYCHOL. 6.1, 6.10–11 (2017); Julia R. Zuwerink & Patricia G. Devine,
Attitude Importance and Resistance to Persuasion: It's Not Just the Thought That
Counts, 70 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 931–44 (1996) (both showing strong attitudes
are more resistant to change).
47

Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
48

Id. at 291.
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Id. at 293.
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Id. at 294.
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thesis but did not examine public opinion polling. Subsequent scholars set
out to test his idea that the Supreme Court could influence national policy
via what he called its “unique legitimacy.” Some of these scholars identified
data that supported Dahl’s legitimacy theory. For example, Hanley,
Salamone, and Wright found that the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v.
Wade increased public support for abortion rights, at least in the short run. 51
An ingenious research paper by Katerina Linos and Kimberly Twist studied
the effect of media coverage of Supreme Court decisions dealing with
health care and immigration on popular opinion. They found that when
respondents had been exposed (via television, radio, print reporting, and the
like) to one-sided coverage of a salient decision that was supportive of what
the Court had done, respondents’ views moved in a strongly pro-Court
direction. This effect largely disappeared when individuals were exposed to
more balanced coverage of the new decision that described its pros and
cons, however. 52 An impressive book by Valerie Hoekstra provided a more
mixed picture. Hoekstra studied the localized public response in four
communities where disputes that made their way to the Supreme Court
arose. 53 She found that the disputes garnered a lot of local press attention,
and in two of the four cases there was a discernible if small shift in local
sentiment towards the Court’s position after a Supreme Court decision. 54
But in the other two cases she studied, no such shift occurred. 55
As the political science research continued, many empirically oriented
scholars collected data that did not match Dahl’s legitimacy thesis. Rather,
what political scientists were finding in many cases was that after a major
Supreme Court decision, some population groups fell in line with the
Court’s decision and others strongly resisted it, consistent with a motivated
cognition response. This data helped give rise to the structural response
model, first articulated by Charles Franklin and Liane Kosaki. 56 According
51

John Hanley et al., Reviving the Schoolmaster: Reevaluating Public Opinion in
the Wake of Roe v. Wade, 65 POL. RES. Q. 408, 416-18 (2012).
52

Katerina Linos & Kimberly Twist, The Supreme Court, the Media, and Public
Opinion: Comparing Experimental and Observational Methods, 45 J. LEGAL.
STUD. 223 (2016).
53

VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(2003).
54

Id. at 112-14.
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Id.
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Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, The U.S. Supreme Court, Public
Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751 (1989).
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to Franklin and Kosaki, salient Supreme Court cases are likely to persuade
some groups of voters and spark a backlash among others. Where one
observed no change in public sentiment after a major Supreme Court
decision, it is possible that the decision itself and media reports about it
didn’t change minds. But it is also possible that the decision changed a lot
of minds, though the people who were pushed into support or opposition
roughly cancelled each other out. 57 Under this account, the public sentiment
on a germane issue could become more polarized after a major Supreme
Court decision than it was beforehand, again consistent with a motivated
cognition response. 58 Studies of popular reactions to decisions concerning
homosexual sodomy seemed to have polarized opinion in this way. Both
Bowers v. Hardwick 59 (which upheld a criminal prohibition on sodomy) and
Lawrence v. Texas 60 (which struck it down) sparked a significant decline in
popular support for same-sex relationships. 61
To be sure, support for same-sex relationships has risen very
dramatically since Bowers, but each judicial opinion sparked a discernible
negative reaction in popular sentiment, such that it took several years after
Lawrence was decided for popular support for same sex relationships to
reach the approval levels it garnered just before the decision. 62 Indeed,
Gallup polling data reveal that there have been only two periods since 1979
in which a plurality of Americans said that “homosexual relations between
consenting adults should not be legal”: 1986 to 1989 (right after Bowers)
and 2003 (right after Lawrence). 63 Demographic characteristics strongly
predicted whether Americans were likely to rally around gay rights or reject
them after the decisions. 64 More recent work supports their findings,
producing evidence of partisan polarization in the response to Burwell v.
57

Id. at 753-54, 767-68.

58

Interestingly, the response to Roe loomed large for Franklin and Kosaki as well,
even though they took very different implications from it than Hanley, Salamone,
and Wright. Compare supra text accompanying note 51.
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539 U.S. 538 (2003).
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See James W. Stoutenborough et al., Reassessing the Impact of Supreme Court
Decisions on Public Opinion: Gay Civil Rights Cases, 59 POL. RES. Q. 419 (2006).
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Id. at 430.

63

See Gallup, Gay and Lesbian Rights, available at http://www.gallup.com/
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Hobby Lobby, 65 a 2014 Supreme Court decision. 66 Follow-up work on the
structural model produced more confounding findings, with mixed results
concerning how the public responds when the Court issues several decisions
about the same topic. 67
Finally, in recent years a new model has emerged to describe the
popular reaction to prominent Supreme Court decisions. Joseph Ura’s
thermostatic model posits that when the Supreme Court makes increasingly
liberal decisions the populace will embrace decreasingly liberal policy
views, and vice versa. 68 The thermostatic model regards the American
populace as interested in stability in the short run, such that they will pull
back against decisions that seem to alter the status quo. Over the long run,
though, the thermostatic model posits that the kind of legitimization effect
that Dahl hypothesized does seem to occur. Ura describes his data as
indicating “a complex interaction between the Supreme Court and the mass
public characterized by short-term backlash against Supreme Court
decisions in public mood followed by a long-run movement in public
opinion toward the ideological position taken up by the Court.” 69 Notably,
the thermostatic model focuses on the aggregate effects of all the Supreme
Court’s salient / high-profile decisions in a particular Term, rather than
trying to isolate the effects of a single Supreme Court decision concerning
abortion, the Second Amendment, the death penalty, or election law. 70
Having surveyed this rich literature, let’s examine what it might tell us
– and what it might not tell us – about attitudinal circularity with regard to
65

134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).

66

Aziz Z. Huq & Avital Mentovich, The Polarizing Court (2015 unpublished
manuscript).
67

In cases where the Supreme Court rendered several decisions about a topic (as
with abortion or the death penalty), some evidence suggests that only the Supreme
Court’s first major decision on a topic seemed to generate a discernible impact on
popular opinion. See Timothy R. Johnson & Andrew D. Martin, The Public’s
Conditional Response to Supreme Court Decisions, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 299,
306 (1998). But other research examining the abortion data through a different lens
failed to replicate that finding. Danette Brickman & David A.M. Peterson, Public
Opinion Reaction to Repeated Events: Citizen Response to Multiple Supreme
Court Abortion Decisions, 28 POL. BEHAV. 87 (2006).
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Joseph Daniel Ura, Backlash and Legitimation: Macro Political Responses to
Supreme Court Decisions, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 110, 111-13 (2014).
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the Katz test. First, the idea that the public will fall into line with the
Supreme Court’s pronouncements about search and seizure law seems
unlikely. In many of the political science papers, there was zero net impact
on public attitudes, and in some cases the effect was actually negative. Also,
most Fourth Amendment decisions are not particularly salient. They do not
receive significant media coverage and, as a result, the overwhelming
majority of citizens do not know they happened. 71 As scholars in this area
are quick to point out, the public knows little about what the Court does. 72 It
might strike a reader as surprising to think that the Court would have no
effect as often as not: should it not matter that a relatively liked institution
has endorsed a particular position? Well, yes, it should. But only if the
public is aware of the endorsement and not so attentive to the issue to
ignore the peripheral cue in favor of attention to the issue’s merits. And
when persuasion occurs in that sweet spot of shallow processing it is likely
to be particularly fragile.
Second, even when a highly significant Supreme Court criminal
procedure decision (like Katz, Miranda, or Jones) is announced, we should
not be so quick to assume that the public will be persuaded by the Court’s
moral judgment. That could happen under a legitimacy theory, and it could
happen in the long run under the thermostatic theory. But the structural
response model suggests that the public will become more polarized after
the Court’s intervention, and will not collectively follow it. And here
motivated cognition, which indicates that those opposed to a Court decision
will counterargue against it, and the ELM, which posits that source
characteristics are generally peripheral cues and unlikely to persuade those
who are thinking deeply about an issue, both support the skepticism of the
structural model. Finally, consistent with the thermostatic model we might
expect to see a short run backlash against the Court’s judgment, suggesting
the opposite of attitudinal circularity in the Fourth Amendment context.
The collection of mixed effects just reviewed doesn’t even address the
question of how well insights drawn from outside the Fourth Amendment
will translate to the search and seizure context. Might some of the
heterogeneity just reviewed be a function of the different issues studied,
which ranged from abortion, to capital punishment, to gay rights, to purely
local issues? It seems possible.

This phenomenon of citizen ignorance about important developments in
government is hardly unique to the work of courts. See generally ILYA SOMIN,
DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE (2d ed. 2016).
71
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In short, given the widespread belief in attitudinal circularity among
Supreme Court justices and leading Fourth Amendment scholars, and given
the political science literature that suggests some reasons to doubt the
consensus in elite legal circles, there is an urgent need for empirical work to
examine how the public updates its beliefs about the state of search and
seizure law in response to a major change in the content of the law. We will
describe our effort to fill that gap in Parts II and III. Our main goals for the
study were threefold: to expand on the existing literature by measuring the
impact of a Fourth Amendment decision, which had not previously been
done, to track both the immediate and long-term effects of the decision, and
to assess a range of privacy attitudes so we could determine exactly how
public expectations shifted in the wake of the decision.
II.) RILEY V. CALIFORNIA
Assessing attitudinal circularity requires information about privacy
expectations before and after a major Supreme Court decision on the scope
of the Fourth Amendment. Such decisions are uncommon, and major
polling organizations do not regularly poll on privacy expectations, let alone
poll with the level of specificity needed to measure the impact of a
particular case. 73 A golden opportunity to test the attitudinal circularity
hypothesis arose in early 2012, when the Supreme Court United States v.
Jones. 74 That surprising and widely publicized decision substantially altered
Fourth Amendment law, suggesting that the Constitution might protect
information about a vehicle’s movements from one public place to another.
But nobody thought to use precise polling to obtain a before and after
snapshot of public attitudes on GPS tracking. Even if scholars had tried, the
timing of the Jones decision was so unpredictable 75 that there was a
significant danger that the pre-Jones polling might occur several months
before the Court’s decision, increasing the chances that some extrinsic
factor explained any observed shifts in attitudes. We conceptualized the
present project by bemoaning the missed opportunity in Jones and
wondering whether lightning might strike a second time.
The following year we realized there might be precisely such an
opportunity in Riley v. California. 76 Two consolidated Fourth Amendment
73

See, e.g., Valerie J. Hoekstra & Jeffrey A. Segal, The Shepherding of Local
Public Opinion: The Supreme Court and Lamb’s Chapel, 58 J. OF POL., 1079,
1083–84 (1996).
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cases concerning police searches of cell phones were calendared for the last
week of oral argument in the Supreme Court’s 2013 Term. And cases
argued at the end of the Term are usually handed down at the end of the
Term, so we could time our polling with much more precision than usual.
We did not expect that Riley would be nearly as big of a deal as it turned out
to be, but there was a chance of something major happening in Fourth
Amendment law so we figured paying for two nationally representative
samples was a worthwhile gamble.
David Riley’s case involved the recovery of pictures from his smart
phone, and the consolidated case of Brima Wurie involved the recovery of
an address from a flip phone’s contact list. Existing case law had been read
to allow warrantless searches of physical containers in the arrestees’
possession, like purses, wallets, and briefcases, incident to arrest. 77 So an
arrested person could expect a warrantless search of any personal papers
they were carrying, including address books and the like. A literal-minded
application of precedent would have applied the same rule to cell phones:
why should it matter whether the seized address book was physical or
electronic? As Judge Posner observed not long before Riley, “[i]t’s not even
clear that we need a rule of law specific to cell phones or other computers.
If police are entitled to open a pocket diary to copy the owner’s address,
they should be entitled to turn on a cell phone to learn its number.” 78 Before
Riley, the federal appellate courts frequently upheld warrantless searches of
cell phones incident to arrest. 79 Writing on SCOTUSBlog before oral
argument, Lyle Denniston anticipated that the Court would be “cautious”
perhaps deciding “these cases narrowly,” in a manner that treated smart
phones and flip phones differently. 80 A few days later, summarizing oral
77
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pack); United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1123, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987)
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552 F.3d 405, 411-12 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 809-10
(permitting a limited cell phone search incident to arrest, while reserving the
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warrant).
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SCOTUSBlog, April 25, 2014, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/
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arguments in the two cases, Denniston seemed certain of little except his
“strong impression that the Justices would stay away from flat rules: either
that police can always search any such device that they take from an
arrested person, or that they could not search its contents at all.” 81 We think
the average citizen knew essentially nothing about the cases before they
were decided, and the lawyers that were following them do not appear to
have expected a sea change in the law.
Despite these modest expectations, Riley charted a new course. The
Court likened the argument that cell phones were “materially
indistinguishable” from briefcases to “saying a ride on horseback is
materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of
getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping them
together.” 82 Cell phones simply contain too much information to treat them
like physical papers. So the Court fashioned a bright line rule, albeit with a
caveat that police could dispense with the need for a warrant in standard-ish
“exigent circumstances.” As the Chief Justice concluded his opinion: “Our
answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone
seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.” 83
Most surprisingly, the Court’s ruling against the government was
unanimous, 84 and Chief Justice Roberts’ decision received prominent and
generally celebratory media coverage in the days following the ruling.
Political scientists observe that the existence of dissents in prominent
Supreme Court cases tends to draw significant media attention, resulting in
an increased likelihood of a polarized public response to a ruling by the
Court. 85 But when the public reads one-sided, positive coverage of an
opinion, they are likely to be persuaded by what the Court had done. 86 So
81
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Stoutenborough et al., supra note 61, at 425.
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See supra text accompanying note 52.
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the unanimity of Riley amplified the “treatment dosage” in terms of judicial
influence on public beliefs.
Riley figured prominently in the nightly news broadcast for the major
networks on the evening of the decision, with NBC and CBS making it their
lead story and ABC discussing it as their second story of the night. 87 Stories
about Riley were front page news in most of the nation’s largest circulation
newspapers as well, 88 another factor that political scientists view as
meaningful in determining whether a case can be described as sufficiently
salient to capture public attention. 89 The Los Angeles Times called Riley the
Supreme Court’s “most sweeping and surprising criminal-law opinion in
years.” 90 The Washington Post emphasized the surprising nature of the
decision, especially given the uncertainty apparent when the case was
argued: "During oral arguments, the justices seemed divided over the issue.
But they united behind soaring language from Roberts about privacy
87

See Transcript, ABC World News with Diane Sawyer, June 25, 2014, available
at 2014 WLNR 17743541 (Riley was the second story reported, with the Court
calling it a “landmark ruling” and a commentator calling it “probably the most
important privacy ruling in the digital age”); Transcript, CBS Evening News, June
25, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 17458527 (Riley was the first story reported,
with anchor Scott Pelley noting that “the Supreme Court justices spoke with one
voice today,” and CBS News Correspondent Jan Crawford calling it “a major
victory for privacy rights in the modern digital era”); Transcript, NBC Nightly
News, June 25, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 17465369 (Riley was the first story
reported, with anchor Brian Williams calling it “a big victory for personal privacy”
and commentator Tom Goldstein saying, “It was almost a shock, the breadth with
which the justices were willing to protect private information that's on computers
and cell phones on the internet.”).
88

See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Justices Limit Phone Searches, WASHINGTON POST,
June 26, 2014, at A1; Jess Bravin, Supreme Court: Police Need Warrants to
Search Cellphone Data: Unanimous Supreme Court Says Privacy Outweighs
Police Convenience, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2014, at A1; Adam Liptak, Major
Ruling Shields Privacy of Cell Phones: Supreme Court Says Phones Can’t Be
Searched Without Warrant, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2014, at A1; David G. Savage,
Court Limits Phone Searches, CHI. TRIB. June 26, 2014, at 1. The story did not
make front page news in USA Today. See Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Limits
Phone Searches: Cell Phones More Private than Other Searchable Objects, USA
TODAY, June 26, 2014, at 2A.
89
90

Brickman & Peterson, supra note 67, at 97.

David G. Savage, Court Deems Phones Private: In a Major Ruling, Justices Say
Police Cannot Search the Digital Devices without a Warrant, L.A. TIMES, June 26,
2014, at 1.
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concerns in the digital era…” 91 The New York Times described the case as a
“sweeping victory for privacy rights in the digital age,” and prominently
quoted Orin Kerr’s assessment that the Court had thrust the Fourth
Amendment into “a new digital age. You can’t apply the old rules
anymore.” 92 The Wall Street Journal called Riley “a watershed, showing
that all nine justices are keen to re-examine categorical rules written for an
earlier era.” 93
Riley therefore represented an unambiguous change in law. 94 As Kerr
observed immediately in the wake of the decision “Riley can be fairly read
as saying that computers are a game-changer.” 95 This conclusion had
implications for a variety of parts of Fourth Amendment law, ranging from
warrant specificity, to searches at the national border, to long-term
electronic monitoring in public places. 96 Paul Ohm described Riley as a
“significant milestone in constitutional criminal procedure,” and a “privacy
opinion for the ages.” 97 He added that “Riley v. California is not the only
recent pronouncement from the Supreme Court embracing a new vision of
the Fourth Amendment in a technological age, but it is the most
important.” 98 Whatever the merits of the Riley opinion, from a social
91

Barnes, supra note 88, at A1.

92

Liptak, supra note 88, at A1.

93

Bravin, supra note 88, at A1.

94

Courts in recent years have held that evidence gathered from pre-Riley searches
of cell phones incident to arrest admissible under the Fourth Amendment’s good
faith exception, meaning that before Riley officers were well within their rights to
believe they had the authority to search a cell phone incident to an arrest. See, e.g.,
United States v. Gary, 790 F.3d 704, 708-10 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v.
Eccleston, 615 Fed. Appx. 767 (4th Cir. 2015).
95

Orin Kerr, The Significance of Riley, The Volokh Conspiracy, (June 25, 2014).
Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/
06/25/the-significance-of-riley
96

See, e.g., Charles A Taylor, Fiction of Privacy under the Fourth Amendment:
Examining Warrantless Cell Phone Searches in the Context of Riley v. California,
42 N. KY. L. REV. 395 (2015); Natasha H. Duarte, The Home Out of Context: The
Post-Riley Fourth Amendment and Law Enforcement Collection of Smart Meter
Data, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1140 (2015); Kugler, supra note 31; Kugler & Strahilevitz,
supra note 3.
97

Paul Ohm, The Life of Riley (v. California), 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 133, 133-34
(2015).
98

Id. at 141-42.
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science perspective its unanimity, clarity, and the media’s reaction to it
made it a nearly ideal vehicle for studying the public response to Supreme
Court decisions. As evidently the only empirical researchers studying the
effects of Riley on popular beliefs in real time, we had gotten a very lucky
break.
III.) AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF CIRCULARITY
Because Riley was argued so late in the term, it was possible to
approximate when the decision would issue with relatively high certainty.
This allowed us to schedule the first two waves of our four-wave survey to
closely bracket the decision. The first wave was administered June 11 – 13,
2014, and Riley was handed down on June 25, 2014. Wave II was
administered July 1 – 2, 2014, one week after the decision, to measure its
immediate impact. To measure the longer-term effect, we conducted Wave
III a year after that, May 26 – June 2, 2015, and Wave IV a year after that,
July 21 – August 4, 2016.
For each wave, a weighted sample of adult American citizens was
recruited by Toluna, a professional survey firm with an established panel.
The exact demographics of each wave are reported in the Appendix.
Though there are some other minor variations in representation across
waves, there were no substantial shifts on age, sex, race, or ethnicity, and all
were controlled for in the main analysis.
A. Main Dependent Measure
Since the Riley decision changed the treatment of cell phone searches
incident to arrest, the primary study measure assessed privacy expectations
in that context. Participants were randomly assigned to imagine that a
person was being arrested for either possession of cocaine or attempted
murder. We used the two different crimes so that we could be more
confident that our results were not idiosyncratic to crime type. As discussed
below, crime type had no impact on our change over time story.
Participants were asked two types of questions about a variety of
possible searches, each question intended to tap a slightly different
perspective. One asked “[w]ould the arrestee (i.e., the person being arrested)
reasonably expect that police will [conduct a particular search]?” and the
other asked “[u]nder the Constitution, can the police do this to the arrestee
without first getting a search warrant?” The first question was answered on
5 point scales ranging from “Definitely Not” to “Definitely Yes.” The
“reasonably expect” question places greater emphasis on what is likely to
happen, while the “warrant” question instead emphasizes what the
participant believes the Constitution requires. As part of a previous project,
we experimented with a variety of different ways of asking about
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expectations of privacy. For example, we asked whether a search violated
people “privacy,” “expectations of privacy,” or “reasonable expectations of
privacy,” as well as altering whether the question asked about “people’s”
privacy or “your” privacy. 99 Though using a first-person framing produced
slightly higher privacy expectations overall, we found no other differences.
Here we opted for a third person framing because we thought it odd to ask
participants to imagine themselves being arrested for attempted murder.
The searches the participants were asked to consider were split into
eight physical searches and eight cellphone searches. The particular
searches were selected to represent a range of intrusiveness to allow for
variance in responses. The physical searches included items such as “search
his car for any packages he might be carrying and open the packages” and
“perform a body cavity search.” The electronic searches included “search
the phone for a list of most recent calls” and “use the phone to open his
Facebook app and read his newsfeed and messages.” The text for all
searches is included in the Appendix. Since the change in law was specific
to cell phones and cell phone searches were explicitly differentiated from
physical searches, the physical search questions served as a control.
To simplify the analysis, composite variables were created for both the
physical and electronic searches by averaging the responses to each of the
eight scenarios. As a result there were composite “expectation” scores,
which ranged from 1 to 5 with higher numbers indicating a greater
expectation of privacy, and composite “warrant” scores, which ranged from
0 to 1 and indicated the percentage of the eight scenarios for which warrants
were believed to be required. 100 Greater “expectations of privacy” are
therefore indicated by higher “expectation” scores and higher “warrant”
scores.
An ANCOVA 101 was conducted on these measures that controlled for a
variety of demographic variables to account for the minor cross-sample
variations, and we treated participant wave and attributed crime condition
99

Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 4, at 248 n 170.

All four composites were highly reliable. Expectation-Electronic α = .96,
Warrant-Electronic α = .95, Expectation-Physical α = .85, Warrant-Electronic α =
.80. In the survey itself, higher scores on the expectation measure indicated greater
expectation of searches, but the coding was flipped for analysis to ease
interpretation.
100

101

Analysis of Covariance. This compares means across conditions while
controlling for (holding constant) other factors as in regression. Given the same
inputs, an ANCOVA and a multiple regression are statistically interchangeable.
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(cocaine or attempted murder) as independent factors. 102 Though there were
main effects of attributed crime on the electronic and physical expectation
measures, this factor did not have a significant effect on the warrant
measure and did not interact significantly with wave for either measure. 103
More importantly, there were significant differences across waves on both
of the electronic search dependent measures (expectation and warrant). As
shown in Table 1, both of the measures shifted in a pro-privacy direction
between Waves I (two weeks before) and II (one week after) and then
shifted back to baseline for Wave III (one year after) and IV (two years
after). The two physical search dependent measures did not differ
significantly across waves. 104

102

Specifically, the ANCOVA controlled for sex, age, Black or SE Asian race,
Hispanic ethnicity, and educational attainment. These were selected ex ante but the
results were robust to a variety of possible other arrangements, including raw
(unadjusted) means. Presented dependent variable means are estimated for the
mean scores on each of the controls.

103

There was a significant main effect on the electronic F(1, 4112) = 44.63, p <
.001 and physical F(1, 4112) = 31.92, p < .001 expectation measures, but not on
either warrant measure (Fs < 1). This may indicate that some participants were
reading expectation as a matter of what police would bother to do while reading
the warrant question as covering what the police were legally allowed to do. It was
to deal with this type of interpretative ambiguity that we asked both questions.
104

This could also have been analyzed as a mixed ANCOVA with physical versus
electronic search as a within subject factor. When this analysis is conducted, there
is a significant interaction between search type and wave, supporting the story
presented here.
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Table 1: Adjusted means on primary dependent measures

Electronic Expectation
Search
Warrant
Physical
Search

Wave I:
Wave II:
Wave III:
Wave IV:
Premeasure One Week
One Year
Two Years
N = 700
N = 751
N = 1399
N = 1294
df
2.79 a (.05) 3.00 b (.05) 2.74 a (.04) 2.78 a (.04) 3, 4118

F
5.96 ***

η2
N 105
.004 4132

0.66

(.01) 3, 4118

4.80 **

.003

a

(.02) 0.72

b

(.01) 0.66

a

(.01) 0.65

a

Expectation

2.31

(.04) 2.41

(.04) 2.34

(.03) 2.40

(.03) 3, 4118

1.83

.001

Warrant

0.48

(.01) 0.50

(.01) 0.47

(.01) 0.48

(.01) 3, 4118

1.72

.001

GPS
Composite
Tracking
Other REP Webcam

3.53

(.05) 3.54

(.05) 3.56

(.08) 3.50

(.04) 3, 3075

.29

4.03

a

(.05) 4.02

a

(.05) 3.87

b

(.06) 3.75

b

(.06) 3, 2782

5.94 ***

.006 2796

Facial Rec

2.67

a

(.06) 2.69

a

(.06) 2.56

ab

(.06) 2.47

b

(.06) 3, 2782

2.94 *

.003

.000 3089

Park Camera 2.58

(.06) 2.56

(.06) 2.41

(.06) 2.48

(.06) 3, 2782

1.83

.002

Stingray

(.06) 3.11

(.05) 3.18

(.06) 3.14

(.06) 3, 2782

.34

.000

3.16

ISP Emails

3.26

Cell Site

2.88

Hotel
Registry

a

(.06) 2.96

b

(.06) 3.07

b

(.06) 2, 2084

7.44 ***

(.06) 2.88

(.06) 2.87

(.06) 2, 2084

.02

.000

2.92

(.04) 2.93

(.04) 1, 2673

.05

.000 2683

Numbers are means (std. errors in parentheses). If a measure differs significantly across
condition, scores on that measure that do not share a subscript are significantly different
from each other.

The difference between Waves I and II on the electronic measures
somewhat supported the circularity critique: immediately in the wake of a
relevant Supreme Court decision, people appear to be updating their
expectations on both measures to match the new guiding law. And this is
not a general change in privacy expectations but rather a change targeted to
the content of the decision; expectations regarding physical searches did not
change significantly. What follows Wave II undermines the circularity
105

.007 2096

The reader might be wondering why the number of participants varies so much
across question. Though the main Riley questions were identical across all waves,
variants were introduced for some of the other questions. A large number of
participants in Wave III received different versions of the GPS monitoring
questions, and from Wave III on there were two variants of the “Other REP”
questions, an original and an “author’s preferred” version that removed language
we believed was biasing. Since the subject of interest in this Article is changes
over time, only results from the versions of the questions used in Wave I were
analyzed. Results from Wave III of the “author’s preferred” version are reported in
Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 4, at 260.
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critique, however: expectations returned to their baseline a year after the
decision and they remained there the following year. The best interpretation
of this data are that the effect of Riley on public attitudes was small – the
effect sizes are quite modest – and that even this small effect is likely shortlived.
This data are displayed in Figure 1. Note that while the physical search
expectation and warrant measures (the two lower lines) are flat across wave,
the electronic measures (the two higher lines) both move significantly in the
two-week post-decision wave and then return to their starting levels in the
third wave.
Figure 1: Changes in Expectations and Perceived Warrant Requirements
Across Waves.
3.6

0.75

3.4

0.7

3.2
0.65

3
2.8

0.6

2.6

0.55

2.4
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2.2
2

0.45
Two Weeks Pre

One Week Post
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Two Years Post

Electronic Expectation

Physical Expectation

Electronic Warrant

Physical Warrant

Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

B. Comparison Dependent Measures
Many commentators considering the Riley decision speculated that it
would have a major impact on other areas of Fourth Amendment law. As
noted above, the general question of whether “computers are different”
appears in a number of different guises, and Riley itself can be read as
having serious implications for the mosaic theory, which, if adopted, would
substantially rewrite a number of key precedents. 106 We therefore asked
106

See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111
MICH. L. REV. 311, 313 (2012) (“Under the mosaic theory, searches can be
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about a number of other searches to see whether expectations regarding
them were impacted by the Riley decision. These questions were of the form
used in our prior research, asking “Would it violate people's reasonable
expectations of privacy if law enforcement [performed various searches]”
with the possible responses ranging from 1 – Definitely Not to 5 –
Definitely Yes. Again, higher numbers indicate greater expectations of
privacy. The wording of the particular questions is given in the Appendix.
The cross wave comparison on these questions used the same controls as
the ANCOVA reported on the main measures, though it omitted the crimetype factor as it was not relevant (only the arrest questions referred to it). 107
If there is substantial feedback between judicial decisions and public
expectations then expectations on some of these questions should also
change, and the change should fit the pattern of increasing privacy
expectations immediately after the Riley decision that persist or perhaps
even strengthen over time. This is not observed on any measure. One set of
these questions, discussed in our prior paper on the mosaic theory, asked
about tracking a person’s car on public streets using its onboard GPS
system for various lengths of time (an instant, a day, a week, and a
month). 108 The mean response to these questions did not differ significantly
across waves even though this issue arguably also reduces to “quantity
makes it different” and “electronic surveillance is different,” the exact
issues highlighted by Justice Roberts in Riley. Likewise the use of data from
a camera in the public park was not viewed differently across waves.
The only searches that are viewed differently across time periods are
the remote activation of a laptop’s webcam, the use of facial recognition
technology at a public sporting event, and obtaining a person’s emails from
analyzed as a collective sequence of steps rather than as individual
steps. Identifying Fourth Amendment searches requires analyzing police actions
over time as a collective ‘mosaic’ of surveillance; the mosaic can count as a
collective Fourth Amendment search even though the individual steps taken in
isolation do not.”).
107

As we indicated in supra note 105, we changed how we asked these questions
during the research program. The original wordings for some of these items
described the people searched as criminal “suspects,” which has the impact of
significantly deflating privacy expectations because it is more reasonable to search
someone who is suspected of a crime. For consistency, Table 1 reports responses
only from the participants in each wave who received the “old” versions of the
questions. Responses to the “new” versions are available in our prior paper. Kugler
& Strahilevitz, supra note 4, at 258–60.
108

Id.
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their ISP. The shifts in these attitudes, however, are in the wrong direction
entirely; privacy expectations are reduced in Waves III and IV. Also the
changes in these attitudes did not come in Wave II, as they should have if
Riley were the cause.
One of the searches employed in Waves III and IV asked participants
whether it would violate people’s reasonable expectations of privacy if
police:
Searched a hotel’s guest register to obtain the names,
home addresses, and assigned hotel room numbers of the
guests who stayed there on a particular night?
This search was inspired by Los Angeles v. Patel, 109 which presented a
facial challenge to a California statute requiring hotel operators to keep such
records and open them to police inspection upon request. Patel was the only
major Fourth Amendment search case decided by the Supreme Court during
the 2014 Term. On June 22, 2015, the Court held 5–4 that the statute was in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Both Justice Sotomayor’s majority
opinion and Justice Scalia’s dissent focused on the administrative search
exception and whether hotels were a sufficiently regulated industry that
they could be made to turn over records without having the option of
precompliance review. Justice Sotomayor described the hotel operator’s
privacy expectations in terms of how dangerous their industry was
compared to those previously labeled as closely regulated. 110 Justice Scalia
instead would have the question turn on “the expectations of those who
enter such a line of work,” 111 and specifically whether hotel operators
understood their business to be so regulated that book inspections were par
for the course. But neither would have made the question turn on the
privacy expectations of hotel guests.
The case was pending at the time we ran Wave III and we timed that
wave so that the case would be likely to come down shortly after the wave
was completed. Because public privacy expectations were not at stake in
Patel the way they were in Riley and the decision as written did not
emphasize them, we did not run the same kind of post-decision survey that
year. Wave IV, however, can still serve as a one year out comparison. As
with Riley, one year after the Patel decision privacy expectations were the
same as they were on the predecision baseline; the two numbers are
109

135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015).

110

135 S. Ct. at 2454 (Sotomayor).

111

135 S. Ct. at 2461 (Scalia, dissenting).
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virtually identical (see Table 1). If there was an initial effect of the decision,
it was gone by that time.
The Patel decision would not have been the best candidate for Fourth
Amendment circularity, and we do not want to over-interpret reactions to
this fairly insignificant case. The issue got much less coverage than Riley’s
and the impact on the public’s privacy was one-step removed. But to the
extent that one can draw conclusions, the Patel pattern supports the Riley
story: if the Supreme Court had any effect on public privacy expectations,
that effect was gone within a year.
C. Knowledge of the Riley Decision
It was expected that those who had heard of the Riley decision and
could explicitly remember it would have different reactions than those who
had not and could not. Therefore at the end of the Riley portion of the
survey, participants were asked:
On June 25, 2014, the US Supreme Court announced its
decision in Riley v. California. The Court decided whether a
warrant was required before the police could search the cell
phone of someone they had just arrested. Had you heard about
the Supreme Court's decision in that case prior to this survey?
As shown in Table 2, 40% of the sample in Wave II reported having heard
of the decision, as did 20% in Wave III and 22% in Wave IV. These
numbers seem somewhat high based on previous work on awareness of
Supreme Court decisions, so there may be some false positive reports. Even
major Supreme Court cases often achieve only modest fame, 112 though
awareness is often higher in the immediate wake of decisions. 113 If the 40%
figure is to be believed, it would be on level with national knowledge in the
wake of Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 114 As we noted above, however,
Riley was something of a Fourth Amendment superstar and received an
impressive amount of media coverage, so the figure may not be as

112

C-SPAN, Landmark Cases: Which Supreme Court rulings are Americans
familiar with? (Oct. 1, 2015) (available at http://static.c-span.org/files/pressCenter/
Landmark_Cases_Poll_Release_Oct_1_2015REV.pdf).
113

Valerie J. Hoekstra, The Supreme Court and Local Public Opinion, 94 AMER.
POL. SCI. REV 89, 92–32 (2000). Charles Franklin, Liane C. Kosaki, & Herbert
Kritzer, The Salience of United States Supreme Court Decisions," unpublished
manuscript, *16 (1993) (available at http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kritzer/research/
opinion/spsa1992.pdf) (noting a month long uptick in awareness).
114

HOKESTRA, supra note 53, at 73–75.
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outlandish as the Casey comparison makes it appear. 115 Those who had
heard about Riley generally said they had first heard about the decision from
television coverage (47.5%), with the next most frequently attributed source
being internet news sites and blogs (16.7%). In any event, it is noteworthy,
though not surprising, that the number of the respondents who claimed to
have known about a decision declined by half within a year.
To assess the impact of this self-reported knowledge, an ANCOVA was
conducted that used a variable that combined wave with whether the
participant reported having heard of Riley as its primary predictor. The
ANCOVA otherwise employed the same controls as in the main analysis.
There were thus seven groups (one for Wave I and two for each of the other
waves, one group reporting knowledge and the other not). There were
significant differences across these groups on both of the electronic
measures but on neither of the physical measures. 116 Post hoc analyses
revealed that there was a significant difference in Wave II between those
who reported having heard of the Riley decision and those who had not. As
can be seen in Table 2, those in Wave II who had heard of the Riley
decision had significantly stronger privacy expectations than those who did
not, and there was no difference between people in Wave I (who could not
have heard of a decision that hadn’t happened yet) and those in Wave II
who said they had not heard of Riley. So the increase in privacy
expectations observed in Wave II is being driven entirely be those who
claim to have heard of the decision.

115

See Part II.

Electronic Expectation, F(6, 4112) = 4.85, p < .001 η2 = .007; Electronic
Warrant, F(6, 4112) = 4.74, p < .001 η2 = .007; Physical Expectation, F(6, 4112) =
2.06, ns η2 = .003; Physical Warrant, F(6, 4112) = 1.32, ns η2 = .002.
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Table 2 Adjusted means on primary dependent measures as a function of
self-reported Riley knowledge.
Wave I:
Premeasure
Wave II: One Week
Wave III: One Year
Wave IV: Two Years
Know Riley
NA
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Electronic Expectation 2.79 bc (.05) 2.88 b (.07) 3.19 a (.08) 2.78 bc (.04) 2.64 c (.08) 2.79 bc (.04) 2.75 bc (.08)
Search
Warrant
0.66 bc (.02) 0.68 c (.02) 0.77 a (.02) 0.67 b (.01) 0.63 bc (.02) 0.67 bc (.01) 0.62 c (.02)
Physical
Search

Expectation 2.31

(.04) 2.46

(.05) 2.35

(.06) 2.37

(.03) 2.26

(.06) 2.43

(.03) 2.33

(.06)

Warrant

(.01) 0.50

(.01) 0.49

(.02) 0.47

(.01) 0.46

(.02) 0.48

(.01) 0.45

(.02)

Percent Knowing of
Riley

0.48
NA

40.29

21.09

Numbers are means (std. errors in parentheses). If a measure differs significantly across
condition, scores on that measure that do not share a subscript are significantly different
from each other.

In Waves III and IV, there were no significant differences on these
privacy measures between those who claimed to have heard of Riley and
those who did not. The nonsignificant differences in those waves are
actually in the wrong direction, with those claiming to have heard of Riley
having lower privacy expectations and less protective beliefs about warrant
requirements than others. So in addition to fewer people in Waves III and
IV claiming to have heard of Riley, this claim seems to mean something
different in those waves than it did in Wave II.
The change over time data are also depicted in Figure 2. Note here that
the “Don’t Know” lines are flat across waves whereas the “Know” lines
show changes in Wave II but then return to baseline in Wave III. 117

117

Since participants could not know of Riley before the decision was issued, the
overall data are used for both the “Know” and “Don’t Know” lives in Wave I.

22.41
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Figure 2: Changes in Expectations and Warrant Requirements
Depending on Whether the Participants Knew of Riley.
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Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Results on another measure support the interpretation that knowledge
of the decision has a different meaning in the later waves. In each wave,
participants were asked four questions assessing their knowledge of the
Supreme Court. For example, participants were asked to identify the Chief
Justice and state how many Justices currently sit on the Court. 118 From
these four questions a scale was created ranging between 0 and 1 that
reflected the proportion of questions each participant had gotten correct.
Scores on this measure across the later three waves were analyzed in a 3
(wave) by 2 (knowledge of Riley) ANOVA. Results showed a significant
interaction between knowledge of Riley and wave. 119 Though those
claiming to know about Riley did better on the knowledge test in each wave,
this difference was largest in the second wave, indicating that the difference
in claimed knowledge had the most meaning at that time point. 120 Since
118

All questions given in the Appendix. Note that the number of Justices question
was artificially difficult in Wave IV because the correct answer had changed
following Justice Scalia’s death.

119

F(2, 3419) = 3.25, p < .05 η2 = .002.

Wave II F(1, 748) = 25.79, p < .001 η2 = .033, Mknow = .60, SD = .31; MNot =
.48, SD = .33.
120
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those who said they knew of Riley objectively did know more about the
Court, this gives us increased confidence that a meaningful number of
participants were reporting their knowledge accurately, particularly in Wave
II.
D. Informing about Riley
At the close of the experiment, after all the other data had been
collected, we told people about the Riley decision’s holding and then
readministered the main electronic search dependent measures. The text of
this disclosure is in the Appendix. Participants in Waves II through IV
therefore responded to the electronic expectation and warrant questions
twice: at the start of the study, before they were told of the decision, and at
the close of the study, after they had been. This design was, in our view,
likely to provoke a kind of demand characteristic: having just been given
arguably relevant information about their privacy expectations by the
survey itself, we could reasonably expect that participants would echo that
information back to us. 121 We thought, however, that these data could
present a useful point of comparison.
A mixed ANOVA was conducted on these electronic expectation and
warrant questions that employed crime type, wave, and prior knowledge of
the Riley decision as between subject factors and the timing of the
questions, whether they were before or after having been told of the Riley
decision’s holding, as a within subject factor. 122 There were significant
differences between the expectation and warrant data gathered at the start of
the study and that gathered after the participants had been informed of the
Wave III F(1, 1390) = 3.82, p = .05 η2 = .003, Mknow = .48, SD = .35; MNot =
.44, SD = .31.
Wave IV F(1, 1289) = 12.25, p < .001 η2 = .009, Mknow = .45, SD = .32; MNot =
.38, SD = .30.
121

The experimental approach has been used previously by political scientists. See,
e.g., Patrick J. Egan & Jack Citrin, The Limits of Judicial Persuasion, and the
Fragility of Judicial Legitimacy, 2011 Working Paper, available at
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2gh262w3 (visited Dec. 15, 2016). See generally
Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (1989) (describing the general norms of
conversation, such that listeners will generally assume that information they are
presented with is relevant to the ongoing conversation and is informative). Austin
L. Nichols & Jon K. Maner, The Good Subject Effect: Investigating Participant
Demand Characteristics, 135 J. GEN. PSYCH. 151-165 (2008).
122

The usual effects of wave, crime type, and the interaction between wave and
prior knowledge of Riley were again observed, but they were simply as reported
before.
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Riley decision; having been told of the decision, participants expected more
privacy on both measures. 123 See Table 3 for means. This main effect of
telling participants about Riley was qualified by an interaction with whether
the participant reported having previously been aware of it. 124 Though all
participants had greater privacy expectations after having been told of the
Riley decision, this change was greatest when the participant reported no
prior knowledge of the case. 125
Table 3: Electronic Search Expectations Before and After Having Been
Told About Riley
Informed About Riley
Prior Knowledge
Pre
Post
Expectation No
2.83 (.03) 3.67 (.03)
Yes
2.83 (.05) 3.24 (.05)
Warrant
No
0.67 (.01) 0.84 (.01)
Yes
0.67 (.01) 0.73 (.01)
Numbers are means (std. errors in parentheses).

These results provide something of a cautionary tale for the
measurement of circularity in Fourth Amendment attitudes. As we saw
above, only a small subset of people actually changed their expectations in
the wake of the Riley decision, and this change in their expectations was
short-lived. But this alternative method of assessing circularity, telling
people what the Supreme Court said and then immediately asking them
about the subject, yields a very different answer. Since the question of
circularity is motivated by a concern that general public surveys of privacy
attitudes will be confounded by Supreme Court decisions, it is the former
123

Expectation: F(1, 3421) = 438.33, p < .001 η2 = .114.

Warrant: F(1, 3421) = 167.75, p < .001 η2 = .047.
Expectation: F(1, 3421) = 52.13, p < .001 η2 = .015. Warrant: F(1, 3421) =
37.43, p < .001 η2 = .011.
124

125

The means in the “pre” column are identical across knowledge conditions.
Recall that knowledge of Riley was not associated with greater privacy
expectations in Waves III and IV; it was actually non-significantly in the other
direction. Since this analysis collapses across waves, the positive relationship
between Riley-knowledge and privacy expectations in Wave II gets washed out by
the other two waves.
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method, which does not beat participants over the head with the Supreme
Court’s reasoning, that is appropriate.
E. Comparison to Another Domain: Hobby Lobby
A very prominent case involving the Affordable Care Act’s
contraception mandate, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 126 was decided
June 30, 2014, five days after Riley and one day before Wave II. Since
Waves I and II were going to bracket that case as well as Riley, we also
asked about it in each of our survey waves. The response to this case
underscores the relatively modest effect that the Supreme Court sometimes
has on public attitudes, and also highlights differences across legal domains.
We explained the question at stake in Hobby Lobby like this:
Federal law requires large employers to offer health
insurance coverage to their full-time workers. By law,
employer-sponsored health insurance plans must cover the
costs of certain medical procedures for any employees who
wish to obtain them. A separate federal law, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, prevents the government from
imposing substantial burdens on the sincere exercise of
religious rights without a compelling justification.
Imagine the owners of a family-owned, for-profit
business with 13,000 employees sincerely object on
religious grounds to providing one of the following medical
procedures as part of the company’s health insurance plan.
The described company is modeled after Hobby Lobby itself. After this
prompt, participants were asked whether such a company should be able to
exclude from its healthcare plan coverage for three different medical
services: abortion, birth control, and flu shots. For each service, participants
responded on a 5-point scale that ranged from “Definitely Not” (1) to
“Definitely Yes,” (5) with a midpoint of 3. The three different types
treatment were included to assess whether any effect found on the one
immediately at issue in the case, birth control, would generalize to others. In
Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court held that a for-profit company could
invoke the Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s protections to resist a
mandate that its health insurance plan cover contraceptives.

126

134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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Table 4: Responses to the Hobby Lobby Questions
Abortion
Birth Control
Flu Shot

Wave I
Wave II
Wave III
Wave IV
2.97
(.06) 3.11 (.06) 3.13 (.04) 3.01 (.05)
2.62 ab (.06) 2.77 b (.06) 2.75 b (.04) 2.60 a (.05)
2.30
(.06) 2.23 (.06) 2.35 (.04) 2.26 (.04)

Numbers are means (std. errors in parentheses). If a measure differs significantly across
condition, scores on that measure that do not share a subscript are significantly different
from each other.

The same type of ANCOVA that was employed to measure cross wave
differences on the Riley questions was also used here. There were no
significant differences across waves for the abortion and flu shot questions,
and, as can be seen in Table 4, the differences that were observed on the
birth control question were small and hard to interpret. 127 An inspection of
the means suggests that the public’s understanding of the law moved in the
direction of the Court’s decision between Waves I and II, the immediate
before and after waves, and then moved back to its initial level of support
for religious exceptions in Wave IV. But the change between Waves I and II
is nonsignificant, and the only significant difference is between Wave IV
and the two waves that immediately preceded it.
Unlike in the Riley case, here we do not have a significant attitudinal
move in the direction of the decision the Supreme Court reached. 128 There
could be any number of reasons for this. Perhaps the public had stronger
and more divided initial opinions in Hobby Lobby; it was, after all, a 5–4
decision. Or perhaps something in our description of the issue polarized
respondents. We return to the possibility of polarization in the conclusion.
Two patterns from Riley do hold, however, as seen in Table 5. First,
those in Waves II–IV who reported having heard of the decision were more
likely to support the Court’s outcome in favor of the employer. Unlike last
time, however, there is no interaction here between knowledge and study
wave; the size of the knowledge effect does not differ across waves.
Second, after participants were told of the Court’s holding (here, as with
127

Abortion, F(3, 4118) = 2.24, p = .08 η2 = .002.

Birth Control, F(3, 4118) = 3.05, p < .05 η2 = .002.
Flu Shot, F(3, 4118) = 1.23, p = .30 η2 = .001.
128

This response replicates what Huq and Mentovich found in a longitudinal study
of Hobby Lobby conducted on Mechanical Turk. See Huq & Mentovich, supra
note 66, at 40.
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Riley we readministered the main dependent measures after telling
participants of the holding) they shifted substantially in the direction of it.
Table 5: Effect of Hobby Lobby Knowledge on Post-Decision Views

Abortion
Birth Control
Flu Shot

Abortion
Birth Control
Flu Shot

Prior Knowledge of Hobby Lobby
Yes
No
df F
η2
3.19
(.04)
2.96
(.04) 1, 3415 12.73 *** .004
2.79
2.32

(.04)
(.04)

2.60
2.23

(.04) 1, 3415 10.57 ** .003
(.04) 1, 3415 2.76 + .001

Informed About Hobby Lobby
in Study
Pre
Post
df F
η2
3.07
(.03)
3.29
(.03) 1, 3420 50.73 *** .015
2.70
(.03)
3.13
(.03) 1, 3420 178.85 *** .050
2.28
(.03)
2.66
(.03) 1, 3420 169.41 *** .047

Numbers are means (std. errors in parentheses).

One other revealing note regarding this data is that more people reported
having heard of Hobby Lobby than of Riley: 65% in Wave II, and 46% and
42% in Waves III and IV respectively. This makes a substantial amount of
sense; Hobby Lobby was the main Affordable Care Act case of its term and
it addressed high political salience questions regarding reproductive rights
and freedom of religion.
IV.) IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
The attitudinal circularity hypothesis has been articulated so often and
so widely as to make it almost axiomatic among lawyers and scholars who
work on Fourth Amendment doctrine. Yet it remained untested. Our study
of the popular response to Riley presented a golden opportunity to finally
see how actual people reacted to a major change in privacy law. Fourth
Amendment cases are rarely front-page news, rarely concern a topic that is
both salient and readily comprehensible to laypeople, and are rarely unified.
In Riley v. California the stars were perfectly aligned: the news was on the
front page, smartphones are ubiquitous, and the Court was unanimous. And,
even under these favorable conditions, the attitudinal circularity hypothesis
failed with flying colors.
Based on our data, the most that can be said on behalf of the attitudinal
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circularity hypothesis is when the Supreme Court speaks prominently and
unanimously in a manner that expands privacy rights, that expansion will be
noticed by a minority of the public a week after the decision. Once a year,
or two, has passed, the effect of the decision on popular expectations will
have disappeared entirely. And decisions like Riley that involve one form of
electronic surveillance do not have even short-term effects on popular
attitudes about other forms. Recall that scholars have taken a broad view of
the significance of Riley whereas the public’s expectations about related
searches did not change in response to it. Any attitudinal circularity that
exists in Fourth Amendment law is short-lived and limited, even with
respect to high-profile, surprising, and unanimous decisions like Riley.
The absence of any long-term attitudinal circularity significantly
buttresses the case for approaches to Katz that include public sentiment as a
relevant or even decisive factor in determining whether a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists. Popular beliefs about police surveillance seem
to be very stable, and this stability makes them a potentially useful source
of data for judges seeking to benefit from the wisdom of the crowds.
In addition to refuting a widely-held belief in legal circles, our study
also contributes to the political science literature on how the public
responds to Supreme Court decisions. Recall the recent emergence of an
important hypothesis in political science – the thermostatic model – which
posits that when the Supreme Court moves in one direction, public opinion
will immediately shift in the other direction, but then gradually follow the
Court over the long run. 129 Our data indicate precisely the opposite
dynamic, at least in this particular context. Our data are also in significant
tension with the older legitimacy theory of popular response to Supreme
Court decisions. 130 If anything, the data seem consistent with research
suggesting that the Supreme Court’s decisions do little to influence popular
opinion over the long run. 131
One theory that we cannot address with our Riley data is the structural
response model. None of the personality or demographic measures sampled
in Wave I predicted both initial expectations and perceived warrant
requirements. 132 We therefore cannot neatly divide our sample into groups
129

See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.

130

See supra text accompanying notes 47–52.

131

See, e.g., THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT
(1989); Johnson & Martin, supra note 67, at 306-07; Gerald N. Rosenberg, Book
Review, The Wonder of It All, 45 TULSA L. REV. 679, 686-87 (2009).
132

One personality measure, Rightwing Authoritarianism, predicted warrant
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prone to support and oppose the decision and compare the reactions of those
groups once the decision was published. Our Hobby Lobby data, however,
do allow for that kind of analysis. Though most demographics were entirely
irrelevant to views on the critical issue – support for the birth control
exemption – overall liberalism or conservatism was highly predictive in
Wave I. A regression analysis then showed that the effect of political
orientation became stronger in Wave II, meaning that liberals and
conservatives differed more in Wave II than they did in Wave I. In Wave III
the difference returned to baseline before it actually reversed slightly in
Wave IV. The principal result here is displayed in Figure 3 with liberal and
conservative being estimated at the scale endpoints. Note the spreading of
the liberal and conservative lines in the immediate post-decision data
collection and then the gradual return to initial attitudes. The full regression
analysis is reported in the Appendix.
Figure 3: Support for a Birth Control Exemption Across Waves
4.50
4.00
3.50
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
Two Weeks Pre
Liberal

One Week Post

One Year Post

Moderate

Two Years Post

Conservative

Our data from both Riley and Hobby Lobby most neatly support a
narrative based on the Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion. 133 In
the case of Riley, some portion of the population hears of the outcome
immediately after the decision and, based on a general liking and respect for
the Court, changes its view. But this persuasion is based on a peripheral
cue, liking for the source, and is not deeply processed or understood. This
perceived warrant requirements but not the expectations measures.
133

See supra text accompanying notes 43–46.
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explains both why the population does not generalize from the specific
holding to other searches – they aren’t thinking enough about the subject to
see the connections that are so obvious to experts – and also why the
persuasion is so fleeting. Our findings on Hobby Lobby actually point in the
same direction. Though we observe an initial effect that is consistent with
the structural response model, that effect fades quickly. Again, this shows a
fundamentally shallow and limited effect, likely a function of shallow and
limited processing of the decision. Though Hoekstra’s ELM-based
theorizing ultimately produced mixed results, 134 our data suggest it may be
a fruitful model for future exploration.
More important than our contribution to a general understanding of the
effects of Supreme Court decisions is our ability to weigh in on a domain
where the legal doctrine directly incorporates popular beliefs. As a doctrinal
matter, the beliefs of voters about the First Amendment or gun rights or
separation of powers are irrelevant; the Supreme Court can be and often is
counter-majoritarian. The relevance of public attitudes, if any, would be
indirect and derive from a legal realist conception that the Supreme Court
often follows public opinion. 135 But in a couple domains of constitutional
law – search and seizure law as well as capital punishment, and maybe gay
rights – the Supreme Court has made popular beliefs doctrinally relevant, or
even decisive. 136 Riley is therefore the rare case where popular beliefs about
what the law is can be directly relevant to the legal question before the
Court. And here we have a clear result: the influence of a Fourth
134

See HOEKSTRA, supra note 53, at 112-14. Recall that the data in two of her
cases saw a shift in the Court’s direction and two did not. She had actually made a
more complicated prediction – that the shift would occur in communities
neighboring those immediately involved because they would be exposed to the
decision in popular coverage but not have the self-interest motivations of the
communities immediately involved – but that was not supported.
135

See generally ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 260
(5th ed. 2010) (revised by Sanford Levinson) (“[I]t is hard to find a single
historical instance when the Court has stood firm for very long against a really
clear wave of public demand.”).

136

See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000) (deciding that
squeezing a bus passenger’s bag is a Fourth Amendment search based on the
expectations that an ordinary passenger would have); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 564-68 (2005) (striking down the juvenile death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment’s “evolving standards of decency” test); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015) (noting the relevance under the Equal Protection Clause of
“new insights and understandings [that] can reveal unjustified inequality within our
most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged”).
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Amendment Supreme Court decision on public attitudes is minimal.
That said, our study still leaves some questions unresolved. When the
Supreme Court articulated the hypothesis of attitudinal circularity in Smith
v. Maryland it did so against a backdrop of a government pronouncement
that existing privacy rights had been erased. 137 In Riley a substantial change
in privacy law occurred, but in the opposite direction. The Supreme Court
told the public that they had greater privacy rights in their cell phones than
previous judicial pronouncements had indicated. It is possible that the
popular response to Fourth Amendment decisions is asymmetric, such that a
different dynamic emerges when the government decreases privacy
protections instead of increasing them. Were the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari in a decision that gave it grounds to overrule Katz or Riley, there
would be an opportunity to look for such asymmetries. 138 Similarly, we
could look for such an asymmetry if the executive announced a new
restriction on privacy rights. Until such an opportunity to test the effects of
137
138

See supra text accompanying note 10.

The Supreme Court does not diminish privacy expectations very often in highly
salient cases, but Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), was a famous
example of them arguably pegging legal expectations of privacy below extant
popular expectations of privacy. The wiretapping that federal agents conducted in
Olmstead was a violation of the laws of Washington state, where Olmstead resided
and did business. Id. at 468-69. For that reason, the legally sophisticated Olmstead
believed that even though the government could be wiretapping his calls, evidence
gleaned from those calls could not be used to prosecute him. See DANIEL J.
SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 272 (5th ed. 2015).
Dissenting in Olmstead, Justice Holmes noted that in his view the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the federal government’s introduction of evidence that was
gathered in violation of state law. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469-70 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Arguably, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), which held that
the police do not need a warrant to install a pen registry that tracks all the numbers
dialed by a telephone customer, and California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988),
which held that the police do not need a warrant to search the trash left outside
people’s homes, were other salient examples of the same phenomenon. Even
several years after Greenwood was decided, Slobogin and Schumacher found that
survey respondents continued to regard the police search of the garbage outside
someone’s home as moderately intrusive. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 4,
at 738 tbl. 1. Other cases where the Court’s result would have plausibly surprised
most Americans concern issues that we suspect were not particularly salient to the
average person. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (no expectation of
privacy against aerial surveillance of a greenhouse on private property), United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (no expectation of privacy against the
recording of a conversation with an undercover informant).
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a reverse-Riley decision arises, however, our best assumption is that the
public would respond to privacy-diminishing decisions in much the same
way it responds to privacy-enhancing decisions.
The evidence we report here provides support for neither the weak
version (slow moving shifts in expectations) nor strong version (prompt
shifts in expectations) of the attitudinal circularity hypothesis. That said, our
study provides a better test of the strong version of circularity. We feel that
by studying the effects of a landmark ruling one week, one year, and two
years after the decision we have given circularity a fair shake. We picked up
the immediate effect, such as it was, and then gave the effect time to either
magnify, as word spread, or dissipate, as memories faded. Admittedly, it is
possible that the lasting effects of Riley on the public’s expectations will
emerge after five years, or ten, or twenty. We will continue to insert the
questions we have posed here into nationally representative surveys in the
coming years, and if a shift occurs, we will write about it. That said, the
greater the temporal distance between a decision and a survey, the harder it
is to conclude that any shifts in popular beliefs can be traced to the decision
(or implementations of the decision) as opposed to other confounding
factors. People who insist that the effects of a Supreme Court decision on
popular expectations will emerge only after a decade or two are articulating
a non-falsifiable hypothesis.
Even if circularity operates on a generational timescale, it would be
wise to ask whether this dynamic gives rise to the original problem that
concerned circularity proponents. Privacy expectations must come from
somewhere. Presumably they are a product of, among other factors, cultural
norms, technological capabilities, and political policies. If expectations
update over time to reflect changing realities, this is to the public’s credit.
As we explained in Part I, circularity becomes a problem only if
expectations update quickly enough that it becomes incoherent to ask
government actors to consider what the public thinks. The data presented
here go a long way toward showing that public beliefs are more stable than
that caricature assumes.
Our refutation of the attitudinal circularity hypothesis is not perfect, but
we think our evidence are as convincing as any data are likely to get for the
foreseeable future. To the extent that the law pays attention to empirical
reality, the burden of proof has now shifted to those seeking to demonstrate
that Fourth Amendment circularity is genuine.
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CONCLUSION
Though privacy expectations can change somewhat immediately after a
major Fourth Amendment decision, the change is concentrated among those
who have explicit knowledge of the Supreme Court decision. Over time,
this explicit knowledge appears to be forgotten, and expectations return to
baseline. Therefore the Supreme Court would not be “talking to itself” if it
incorporated public expectations into its doctrinal analysis; privacy
expectations appear to operate largely independently of changes in Supreme
Court doctrine. Though the idea of reasonable expectations of privacy’s
circularity is widely repeated among scholars and even the justices
themselves, the first reliable empirical evidence indicates that, at best, the
phenomenon is very short-lived. In the medium-term, Fourth Amendment
circularity is a myth.
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APPENDIX
Sample Demographics:
In the first three waves, close attention was paid to age, ethnicity, and sex.
Following the census convention, “Hispanic” was asked separate from the
racial categories and “Sex” required a binary answer. In Wave IV, the
sample was also carefully matched on educational attainment and regional
representation. This made it important to control for education in crosswave comparisons; though more carefully matching the census on
educational attainment was desirable, it did lead to an inconsistency across
time periods. Though there are some other minor variations in
representation across waves, only educational attainment shows a major
shift.
Wave
I
II
III
IV
51.71
51.06
50.18
52.55
% Female
Age (years)
Median
46
52
47
46
46.28 (16.74) 50.48 (16.57) 46.30 (16.42) 46.18 (16.94)
Mean
Political
Economic
4.15 (1.67)
4.30 (1.77)
4.32 (1.78) 4.29 (1.72)
Orientation 139 Social
3.83 (1.76)
3.96 (1.85)
4.07 (1.92) 4.08 (1.81)
Overall
3.98 (1.64)
4.12 (1.70)
4.19 (1.79) 4.20 (1.69)
81.14
79.92
79.63
79.21
Race/Ethnicity White
9.86
13.16
13.30
11.82
Black or AA
1.86
1.46
2.00
2.40
Indian or Native
4.57
4.52
4.15
2.86
SE Asian
1.00
0.40
0.57
0.31
Hawaiian/Pacific
16.71
16.76
17.08
17.16
Hispanic
Less than HS
2.00
1.20
2.00
10.97
Education
HS Diploma/GED
30.57
34.04
34.31
32.61
2 Year College
25.57
21.28
23.30
29.13
4 Year College
28.14
29.12
28.02
18.08
Graduate Degree
13.71
14.36
12.37
9.20
40.29
21.09
22.41
Know Riley
700
751
1399
1294
N
For age and political orientation, the numbers in parentheses represent
standard deviations.

139

Measured on seven point scales ranging from 1 Very Liberal to 7 Very
Conservative.
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Hobby Lobby Regression
A regression analysis was conducted of the Wave I data to determine
whether any demographic or attitudinal factor sufficiently predicted views
of the birth control exemption to allow for the kind of analysis required to
test the structural response model. As can be seen in Table A1 below, the
measure of political orientation had the strongest predictive power in Wave
I.
Table A1: Predictions of support in Wave I for the birth control exemption
as a function of demographic and attitudinal variables.
Unstandardized
Standardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
Beta
t
(Constant)
2.297
.142
16.138
Political
.357
.014
.378 25.405 ***
Orientation
Sex
-.310
.048
-.095 -6.517 ***
Age
-.001
.001
-.009
-.590
Black
.189
.072
.038
2.645 **
Hispanic
.124
.063
.029
1.962 *
Education
.096
.022
.066
4.428 ***
Authoritarianism
.041
.026
.024
1.581
SC Knowledge
.095
.075
.019
1.255
A further regression was therefore conducted to examine whether the effect
of political orientation changed across wave, as the structural response
model predicted using the demographic factors controls. As can be seen in
the next Table, the main effect of political orientation was qualified by
interactions in the second and fourth waves, indicating that the effect was
larger in Wave II and smaller in Wave IV. Political orientation was centered
at 0 before this analysis was conducted, so it ranged from -3 to +3.
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Table A2: Predictions of Support for the Birth Control Exemption as a
Function of Political Orientation and its Interactions by Wave.
Unstandardized
Standardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
Beta
(Constant)
2.488
.117
Political Orientation
.374
.034
.395
Wave2
.109
.078
.026
Wave3
Wave4
Wave2 by Political Orientation
Wave3 by Political Orientation
Wave4 by Political Orientation
Sex
Age
Black
Hispanic
Education

.054
-.079
.105
.001
-.100
-.301
-.001
.189
.110
.088

.069
.070
.047
.041
.042
.047
.001
.071
.063
.021

.016
-.023
.047
.001
-.058
-.093
-.006
.038
.025
.060

t
21.320
10.942 ***
1.399
.789
-1.123
2.245
.035
-2.382
-6.406
-.379
2.647
1.746
4.132

To generate means for the figure presented in the paper, the value of the
demographic variables was estimated at their means and the values for
Liberal, Moderate, and Conservative were estimated at -3, 0 and +3
respectively. This produced the following set of values.
Table A3: Estimates of Support for Birth Control Exemption by Wave and
Political Orientation.
Liberal Moderate Conservative
Wave
I
1.50
2.62
3.74
II
1.29
2.73
4.17
III
1.55
2.67
3.80
IV
1.72
2.54
3.36

*
*
***
**
***
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Questionnaire Items
1.
Full list of searches:
• Physical searches
o Search his car for any packages he might be carrying
and open the packages.
o Open his briefcase or backpack to check whether it
contains drugs.
o Fingerprint him.
o Open his backpack, find his diary, and read the diary
to see if it contains anything incriminating.
o Take a DNA sample using a mouth swab.
o Take a blood sample.
o Strip search him.
o Perform a body cavity search on him.
• Electronic searches
o Power on the phone and see what the start-up screen
displays.
o Turn off the phone to prevent its contents from being
encrypted or deleted
o Search the phone for a list of most recent calls.
o Search the phone for the 10 most recent text
messages.
o Search the entire text message history.
o Search the phone’s browser for a list of recent
Google searches.
o Use the phone to access his email account and read
his emails.
o Use the phone to open his Facebook app and read his
newsfeed and messages.
o Subject the phone to a forensic examination to
recover any pictures, documents, and emails that the arrestee
may have deleted.
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GPS tracking questions:

• Used a car's onboard GPS system to locate it on public
streets at a single moment in time without the owner's permission?
• Used a car's onboard GPS system to track its movements on
public streets for one day without the owner's permission?
• Same, but for one week?
• Same, but for one month?
3.

Other Reasonable Expectation of privacy questions

• Used remote activation software to turn on the webcam on a
suspect's laptop without their permission?
• Obtained from an Internet Service Provider copies of emails
exchanged between two suspects in a criminal investigation?
• Select "Definitely Not" for this line to show that you read the
question.
• Used facial recognition software to check whether any of the
fans entering the Super Bowl stadium match images of known
terrorists?
• Installed a video camera to watch a public park where
criminal activity has recently occurred?
• Obtained from a robbery suspect’s cell phone company
stored information about whether the suspect’s cell phone was near
the crime scene when the robbery was committed?
• Used a fake cell tower to trick a suspect's phone into giving
the police more accurate information about where the phone is?
• Searched a hotel’s guest register to obtain the names, home
addresses, and assigned hotel room numbers of the guests who
stayed there on a particular night?
4.

Rightwing Authoritarianism

• It’s great that many young people today are prepared to defy
authority. (RC)
• What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone
following our leaders in unity.
• Students at high schools and at university must be
encouraged to challenge, criticize, and confront established
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authorities. (RC)
• Obedience and respect for authority are the most important
virtues children should learn.
• Our country will be great if we show respect for authority
and obey our leaders.
• People should be ready to protest against and challenge laws
they don’t agree with. (RC)
5.

Supreme Court Knowledge:

• Who is the current Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court?
o Antonin Scalia
o John Roberts
o William Rehnquist
o Elena Kagan
• How many Justices currently sit on the United States
Supreme Court? ___ 140
• Which of the following voted to uphold the individual
mandate portion of the Affordable Care Act (also known as
"Obamacare") in 2012?
o Clarence Thomas
o David Souter
o John Roberts
o Anthony Kennedy
• How many women currently sit on the United States
Supreme Court?____
6.

Riley Knowledge Question

• On June 25, 2014, the US Supreme Court announced its
decision in Riley v. California. The Court decided whether a warrant
was required before the police could search the cell phone of
someone they had just arrested. Had you heard about the Supreme
Court's decision in that case prior to this survey? (Yes/No)
140

Unexpectedly the correct answer to this question changed between Waves III
and IV.
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Riley Holding

• In Riley v. California the US Supreme Court decided that the
police generally must get a warrant before examining the
information on a person’s cell phone, even if that person has just
been arrested. In light of this information, please re-answer the
question on the next page.
8.

Hobby Lobby Policy Questions

• If they sincerely object to providing coverage for
ABORTION, should they be able to exclude that from their
healthcare plan?
• If they sincerely object to providing coverage for BIRTH
CONTROL PILLS, should they be able to exclude them from their
healthcare plan?
• If they sincerely object to providing coverage for FLU
SHOTS, should they be able to exclude them from their healthcare
plan?
9.

Hobby Lobby Knowledge Question

• On June 30, 2014, the US Supreme Court announced its
decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. The Court decided
whether a for-profit company whose owners sincerely objected on
religious grounds to providing its employees with insurance
coverage for contraceptives nevertheless had to provide such
coverage under the Affordable Care Act. Had you heard about the
Supreme Court’s decision in that case prior to this survey?
10.

Hobby Lobby Holding

• In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby the US Supreme Court decided
that while all large for-profit employers are ordinarily required to
provide health insurance coverage for contraceptives to their fulltime employees, the government could not significantly penalize a
corporation whose owners refused to provide contraceptive coverage
because of the owners’ sincere religious objections. In light of this
information, please re-answer the question on the next page.

